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Shame-to-Cynicism Conversion in The Citadel and The House of God 
 
This article considers a dynamic conversion process in the relationship between cynicism and 
shame, as experienced by doctors. Shame develops when medical professionals fail to live up to 
ideals of practice. Disavowing this shame converts it into a cynicism about the ideals themselves. 
Although this cynicism proves to be a strategic virtue when accepted as part of a clinician’s 
emotional toolkit, it is all too frequently pathologized for complicating or problematizing these 
ideals.1 Pathologizing nascent cynicism produces further shame that extends beyond the original 
failure of practice to encompass a chagrin about a loss of ideals. This conversion process explains 
a correlation between the frequently noted cynicism at work in A. J. Cronin’s The Citadel (1937) 
and Samuel Shem’s The House of God (1978) and the largely ignored moments of shame that mark 
both novels. In the discussion that follows, I establish the presence of a sociological shame-to-
cynicism conversion model that translates across the historical, geographical and structural divide 
separating the two novels. My choice of these two novels as the illustrations of this model is far 
from arbitrary: their overwhelming historical influence, on the development of healthcare systems, 
as contributions to the “hidden curriculum” of healthcare training, and in shaping the conception 
of the doctor for all participants within healthcare contexts, means that their staging of the shame-
to-cynicism conversion may well have wider implications than the mere reading of fiction. While 
medical education has long been concerned with the effects of cynicism, often in relation to 
burnout, there is little that considers the effect of its relation to shame, or on the influence both 




I offer this work as a prolegomenon to a more detailed genealogy of the shame-cynicism dynamic 
in fictions and memoirs written by clinicians, in preparation for further interdisciplinary study of 
its effects in medical education. I begin by establishing the significance of these novels as 
bildungsroman that have influenced the wider imaginary of practitioner development. Then, I 
considers how the novels reflect the institutionalization of medical bildung, as theorized by Erving 
Goffman, paying particular attention to Goffman’s interest in cynicism and shame. Such processes 
can be linked, I argue, through a shame-to-cynicism conversion, a process modelled on Bonnie 
Mann’s concept of the shame-to-power conversion, which occurs in the formation of sovereign 
masculinity. Returning shame-to-cynicism conversion to Goffman’s institutionalization can, I 
conclude, identify a hitherto unacknowledged relation between institutionality and affect that 
explains the novels’ lasting appeal to the hidden curriculum in medical training, formation or 
bildung. 
 
The Influence of The Citadel and The House of God 
 
A. J. Cronin’s fifth novel, The Citadel, follows its protagonist, Andrew Mason, from his first 
position as a medical assistant in a Welsh mining village through his work for a Medical Aid, his 
move to London to advise the Coal and Metalliferous Mines Fatigue Board, then his turn to private 
practice, and finally his decision to open a cooperative clinic based on the principles of evidence 
based medicine. One does not need to endorse the popular fiction that it inspired the UK’s National 
Health Service to admire the novel’s profound influence over the medical profession in the more 
than eighty years since it was published.3 The medical memoirist, Adam Kay, in his introduction 
to the 2019 revised edition, calls it “a statement of intent that is still relevant over eighty years 
 
 
later. It’s a warning from history that genuinely changed the future”.4 Certainly, it sold and sold 
well: 150,000 copies in its first three months, 10,000 each month after that until the end of 1937.5 
Its numerous reprints sported the dust jacket quote “One of the 3 or 4 most famous novels of the 
last twenty years”.6 It was immediately popularized by a film version by King Vidor (1938); further 
film adaptations followed in Hindi (1971), Bengali (1972) and Telugu (1982), as well as television 
adaptations in the US (1960), Britain (1960 and 1983) and Italy (1964 and 2003). This success was 
not without controversy: Sally Dux demonstrates that the proposed Vidor adaptation faced scrutiny 
from censors in 1937 because of concerns that it might “shake” or “damage” the public’s faith in 
the medical profession.7 Seamus O’Mahony suggests three reasons for its contemporary success: 
“a) timing, b) the novel’s accurate portrayal of a dysfunctional medical care system easily 
recognisable to its readers, and c) Gollancz’s genius for promotion.”8 The novel was canonized for 
being a timely attack on a dysfunctional medical system, even as it enjoyed financial success and 
a longevity of influence on the mores of health professionals. In this, it resembles a stylistically 
quite different novel published some 40 years later: Samuel Shem’s The House of God.    
 
Shem’s first novel, The House of God, chronicles Roy Basch’s year-long internship at the House 
of God (modelled on Shem’s internship at the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston) and his relations 
with his fellow interns, his mentor (the Fat Man), the Chief Resident and Chief of Medicine and 
his girlfriend, Berry. Like The Citadel, it has enjoyed significant financial success alongside its 
longevity as a critical medical bildungsroman: over three million copies have been sold, in some 
fifty languages. Successive anniversaries, in 1995, 2008 and 2018, have produced a wealth of 
critical reflections.9 Again, this impact is, perhaps, a matter of timing and of portrayal. The 
physician and historian of medicine, Kenneth M. Ludmerer, notes that the novel “struck a chord” 
 
 
in the years after its publication that challenged the status quo: “younger doctors loved the book, 
while older physicians pilloried him for having written it.”10 Like The Citadel, it presented an 
attack on the system, making “a mockery of the serious, dignified process of transforming a callow 
medical student into a mature physician.”11 According to Ludmerer, Shem’s account of residency 
training “accurately portrayed the conditions of residency it satirized, and that the underlying 
conditions that led to fatigue, burnout and cynicism […] have not substantially changed in the 
three decades since the appearance of the novel.”12 This by no means comprehensive review of the 
reception histories for The Citadel and The House of God should impress upon the reader the sway 
that these novels have had, and continue to have, in shaping a popular imaginary about inherent 
problems in the medical formation or bildung of doctors, and in contributing to a hidden 
curriculum, understood to be the unofficial or informal means by which professionals are trained, 
educated, or socialized. This influence is in no small way related to the way that the novels are 
positioned as auto-commentary or thinly veiled fictions by trained clinicians (i.e. as individual, 
“cynical” responses to processes of medical training and practice “authenticated” by insider 
authors).  
 
Both novels have certainly been read as medical Bildungsroman. For Anne Hudson Jones, 
identifying The House of God as such, the bildungsroman “focuses on the education and 
maturation of a young man who is set apart by some special gift, such as heightened sensitivity, 
artistic talent, or remarkable intellectual capacity, while the medical bildungsroman is a specialized 
version of this subgenre in which a young physician, often but not always an intern or resident, 
sets out to find his special calling and to master his craft”.13 O’Mahony appeals to this notion of 
bildung, when describing The Citadel as “the struggle of the idealistic young hero against the 
 
 
medical establishment, which is corrupt, venal, unscientific and self-serving”.14 So too The House 
of God, albeit with one notable exception: whereas The Citadel took aim at an medical 
establishment that was “unscientific”, The House of God targeted a medical establishment whose 
scientism had begun to obstruct patient care. Denis Noble observes that the corruption and venality 
of The House of God manifests as overt scientism: “medicine then becomes working out what 
molecular problems are and fixing them”.15 Shem’s emphasis on the need to bring care back into 
evidence-based medicine presents the mirror image of Cronin’s earlier desire to introduce evidence 
into medicine to liberate it from quackery. Written on either side of what O’Mahony has elsewhere 
described as the “Golden Age of Medicine” (roughly 1930 to the mid-1980s), both novels use the 
bildungsroman as the formal means to launch a social critique of medical establishments 
characterized by different, even contradictory problems.16  
 
To align the texts more precisely, across their historical divide, we might turn to one concern that 
they share: the relationship between medical care and profit. This interest in profit provides an 
entry point into the forms of cynicism at work in the novels. An emphasis on profit often produces 
cynicism: after all, the cynic, Oscar Wilde famously quipped, “knows the price of everything and 
the value of nothing”.17 So, we might observe that a concern for economic or social capital drives 
many of the characters into patterns of behavior that detract from the care of the patients. For 
Cronin, writing in Britain prior to the establishment of the National Health Service, the medical 
system is rigged to profit doctors that attend to their bills more than their patients. For Shem, the 
system of retaining patients who might be better served by being discharged (i.e. “gomers”) is 
designed to maximize profits for the hospital and for the private attendings. In forcing idealists to 
challenge their complicity with such systems, however, such cynicism carries, even causes, shame. 
 
 
Paradoxically, cynicism also provides the means to disavow this shame, as it forms a necessary, if 
imperfect, shield of detachment for the otherwise implicated clinician. 
 
Shame appears to sidestep a discussion of detachment and cynicism. If anything, both detachment 
and cynicism suggest a repudiation of, or indifference to, shame. Shame does not seem a significant 
point of difference between the two. After all, the key distinction between detachment and 
cynicism is motivation. Whereas detachment maintains a belief in the wider ethos of an activity, 
cynicism undercuts that belief by considering the undue influence material benefits exert on this 
ethos. When William Osler, the so-called father of modern medicine, advocated the cultivation of 
equanimity, the antecedent to medical detachment, in the medical encounter, he warned against 
the emotional cost of “large and successful practice”: “Engrossed late and soon in professional 
cares, getting and spending, you may so lay waste your powers that you may find, too late, with 
hearts given away, that there is no place in your habit-stricken souls for those gentler influences 
which make life worth living.”18 For Osler, the pursuit of profit displaces “those gentler 
influences”, but it also hints at the risk cynical motivations pose to the ideals of equanimity or 
medical detachment, “laying waste” to one’s powers and “giving away” hearts. Osler, however, 
introduces shame as further impediment to equanimity. Earlier in his lecture on “Aequanimitas”, 
Osler suggests shame presents a more immediate risk to a clinician’s “imperturbability”:  
 
Far be it from me to urge you, ere Time has carved with his hours those fair brows, to 
quench on all occasions the blushes of ingenuous shame, but in dealing with your patients 
emergencies demanding these should certainly not arise, and at other times an inscrutable 
face may prove a fortune. In a true and perfect form, imperturbability is indissolubly 
 
 
associated with wide experience and an intimate knowledge of the varied aspects of 
disease.19 
 
The suggestion, then, is that if cynicism imperils the clinician’s equanimity by causing them to 
feel too little, shame is equally dangerous for causing them to feel too much. We can find echoes 
of Osler’s message in The House of God, when The Fat Man, Roy’s cynical mentor and the novel’s 
leading exponent of care-based medicine, reproves Roy for speaking too frankly with his patients’ 
families: “Some things have to be kept private, Basch. You think parents want to hear 
schoolteachers making fun of their kids?” (268) If equanimity demands the clinician “quench the 
blushes of ingenuous shame”, however, its pathological excess, cynicism, risks extending this 
quenching process to “all occasions”.  
 
To explore this quenching further, I want to take The Citadel and The House of God as exemplary 
accounts of the dynamic that exists between clinician cynicism and clinician shame, even if they 
are not, in themselves, extraordinary texts. Here, we should note their reliance on the unmarked 
presumption that doctors are overwhelmingly white, cis and male, a presumption unchallenged by 
scenes characterized by blatant racial and gender stereotyping or language that ranges from clunky 
to crude. My interest stems from their influence on the profession, where they are still regarded as 
“de facto required reading by medical students preparing to enter their residency programs”.20 This 
influence permits an analysis that can realistically extend itself from the representation of 
profession within the novels to broader claims about how these representations have been 
internalized, since the books were published. When Jones compared Upton Sinclair’s 1925 novel, 
Arrowsmith, to The House of God to demonstrate a general decline of the doctor hero between the 
 
 
1920s to the 1970s, she justified their chronological disconnect by noting that “these two works 
clearly demarcate changes in the literary image of the physician during this century and point to 
underlying causes.”21 Their clarity of contrast offsets her analysis’s lack of historical detail. 
“Images of physicians in literature”, she concludes, “can serve as an important barometer of 
changing cultural values, desires, and fears.”22 Jones’s reading of the novels as barometers is itself 
a barometer of their presence within the hidden curriculum of medical education. My aim here, 
however, is not simply to measure the changing cultural values, desires and fears represented by 
the novels as bookends to O’Mahony’s Golden Age. Shifting Jones’s analysis to include The 
Citadel affords a comparison that exceeds either the sociology of either UK or US medical contexts 
or an overly straitened historicism. It demonstrates a trend towards a shame-to-cynicism 
conversion in fictions that represent the institutionalization of health professional development.  
 
Goffman and the Institutionalization of Cynicism 
 
Midway through The House of God, Berry, a clinical psychologist, invokes Erving Goffman to 
explain why her relationship with Roy, her boyfriend and the novel’s protagonist, has deteriorated 
dramatically in the four months since he began his medical internship. “Oh sure,” she remarks, “ 
there’s the camaraderie, and you’re right, the only reason men go to war is to die with their buddies, 
but it seems to me that what’s happening to you is the total institutionalization of the internship, á 
la Goffman”.23 We can take Berry’s statement as something of a signature statement for the novel. 
Certainly, the physical institution of the hospital is foregrounded in the novel, which, after all, 
emphasizes itself a site, a house. There are further correspondences with social institutions of 
professional and personal masculinity. During the course of Roy’s internship, he uses rhetorically 
 
 
and sexually heightened performances of masculinity to compensate for the general deterioration 
of his relationships with Berry, his teachers and his fellow interns. The phrase attends to the wider 
concern of the novel: the structural deformations wrought upon (male) junior doctors by their 
medical internships, which they make bearable through a homosocial “camaraderie” that 
surrogates for genuine care. In order to satirize this moral deterioration rather than condemn it, 
Shem has Berry adopt a reflexive distance in her statement, established by the dry witticism about 
war and the informal academese mention of Goffman. Such moments of reflexive detachment are 
doubtless the reason why many readers repeat “cynical” in descriptions of the novel. The label is 
useful, insofar as it gestures to a feedback mechanism in the novel, linking cynicism to an 
institutionalized deterioration of care. Moments of cynicism in the novel are not merely responding 
to “the total institutionalization of the internship” or the problematic sexual politics of 
“camaraderie” diagnosed by Berry; they also facilitate the expansion and perpetuation of these 
dynamics. As Roy disengages from his empathetic bonds for reasons of objectivity and self-
protection, so the novel presents detachment, often taken to be a virtue amongst doctors, as 
analogous, even coterminous, with cynicism, especially as both develop in incomplete defense 
against shame.24 
 
Berry’s invocation of Goffman invites Shem’s readers to think of the internship in terms of 
Goffman’s total institutions, which, like Michel Foucault’s disciplinary institutions, employ 
clearly defined spatial limits to socialize its participants into certain patterns of group behavior. 
For Goffman, “a total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large 
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of 
time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life”.25 Certainly, Berry is right to 
 
 
observe in Roy “the total institutionalization of the internship”; although he does not live at the 
hospital as Goffman suggests of other inmates of total institutions, Roy has undergone the 
necessary “mortification” of the self identified by Goffman, whereby links with the subject’s 
previous life are systematically stripped away. The novel is, after all, an account of Roy’s struggles 
as he internalizes the contradictory values of the House, arranged as a dialectic between the 
ostensible principle of medicine espoused by senior staff, to do everything for the patient always, 
and its more grounded antitheses “The Laws of the House of God” professed by their progenitor, 
the Fat Man. Indeed, The House of God might well be read as a Goffmanian allegory of hospital 
internships as total institutions. Read in this light, the already implicit connections between the 
titles of The House of God and The Citadel can be thought of as more than casual allusions to 
accommodation. They foreground the physical and social institutions of the medical establishment, 
against which the protagonists repeatedly hurl themselves. If anything, The Citadel emphasizes 
the social function of these total institutions over Goffman’s original concern with physical site, 
since there is no single physical space that incorporates all the heterogenous sites of institutional 
malfeasance observed by Andrew. Emphasizing physical and social space, however, remains 
insufficient because it does not explain the affective responses of Roy and his fellow interns, or of 
Andrew and his colleagues. They do not simply become cynical because their eyes are opening to 
the “realities” of the medical establishment; rather, the medical establishment exerts an influence 
the doctors’ belief in their self-presentation, their role performance, in everyday life.  
 
Goffman’s first work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), opens with a distinction 
between sincere and cynical role performance. The first chapter begins with the claim that an 
individual playing a part “implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is 
 
 
fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the 
attributes he appears to possess”.26 The performer may be sincere, “taken in by his own act”, or 
cynical, “when the individual has no belief in his own act and no ultimate concern with the beliefs 
of his audience”.27 But a cynical individual may also “delude his audience for what he considers 
to be their own good, or for the good of the community”: “practitioners who may otherwise be 
sincere are sometimes forced to delude their customers because their customers show such a 
heartfelt demand for it. Doctors are led into giving placebos [...] these are cynical performers 
whose audiences will not allow them to be sincere”.28 Building on Becker et al’s seminal 
anthropological work in medical education, later published as Boys in White (1961), Goffman 
notes that doctors may become cynical performers because their patients need them to be. This 
shifting of roles, from episode to episode, gestures towards a more gradual progression from 
“conviction or insecure aspiration and ending in cynicism”.29 Goffman suggests professions such 
as medicine implicitly advocated this development, not only because it deludes the patient-
audience, but “because they can use this cynicism as a means of insulating their inner selves from 
contact with the audience”.30  
 
Following Boys in White, researchers have frequently returned to cynicism as an unfortunate 
consequence of medical training and practice, using it to describe a loss of idealism and 
concomitant deterioration of empathy.31 Such discussions typically open with already 
pathologized definitions of cynicism. Peng et al, for instance, take cynicism to be “a decline in 
empathy and emotional neutralization”.32 Such fine-grained definitions have evolved from earlier 
engagements with cynicism in the medical education literature, as a “disposition of people to find 
fault or doubt the sincerity of those expressing high-minded ideals and standards”.33 The 
 
 
refinement of the term can be understood as a response to problems Loretta Kopelman outlined in 
the early attitude research conducted at medical schools, which, she found, did not seem 
“sufficiently reliable or sensitive to perform the tasks some set for them. As measures, they seem 
problematic, unappreciative of their own value-laden assumptions, and of the diversity of moral 
lives, debates, and considerations”.34 Kopelman observes the problem of reliable attitude testing 
emerges from existing definitions of cynicism. More concrete definitions of cynicism, such as 
Peng et al’s, do permit more rigorous attitude testing. However, more stringent definitions fail to 
address Kopelman’s main aim, which was to ascertain, as a matter of ordinary language use, what 
medical students themselves understand by the word “cynicism”.    
 
Responding to Eron’s definition of cynicism, as “a contemptuous disbelief in man's sincerity of 
motives or rectitude of conduct, characterized by the conviction that human conduct is suggested 
or directed by self-interest or self-indulgence”, Kopelman notes a contradiction: “if human conduct 
is directed by self-interest or self-indulgence, if that is what we are like, then why is holding the 
view that this is true a contemptuous disbelief in man's sincerity of motives?”35 Value-laden 
assumptions about cynicism obscure, to Eron at least, the contradictions latent in his own 
definition. If we resolve this contradiction, by observing a scale variance between the self-
indulgence of the human animal writ large and an individual’s disbelief in the sincerity of motives, 
we can begin to see that individualized definitions of cynicism are necessary but insufficient to 
Kopelman’s actual aim in her essay: to understand why students use the word cynicism when 
describing their disappointment about their education. While the move towards tighter definitions 
improves our understanding of empathy attrition, it does so at the expense of a more complex 
discussion of cynicism’s relations to individuals, groups, and cultures. That is to say, in attempting 
 
 
to fasten cynicism down to a readily observable set of precepts, recent attitude research loses the 
valency cynicism offers, over other near-synonyms like skepticism or “empathy decline”.  
 
A different approach would address the ways in which cynicism comes to be associated with 
particular roles performed within medical contexts, as a product of certain discourses.36 Here, the 
influence of The Citadel and The House of God is not inconsequential, since both novels offer two 
comparable typologies of medical cynicism. Indeed, the characters that personify different cynical 
approaches to the medical system simply introduce the protagonists to the different routes to 
professional development. These flat, one-dimensional characters should not be read as 
“individualized personalities”, following Peter Sloterdijk, “but rather types, that is, social 
characters and characters of a period […] literary figures who can be used to demonstrate 
archetypal features of cynical consciousness”.37 These types differ according to the affective tone 
of the novels, which are strikingly different: whereas the tone of The Citadel is sentimental, 
characterized by scenes of emotional excess, the tone in The House of God remains satiric, even 
at its most poignant, which might account for why “its urgent messages are eclipsed by its riotous, 
cynical, and deliciously quotable moments, especially the 13 brilliant aphorisms known as The Fat 
Man’s House Laws”.38 In The Citadel, Andrew finds “a strange stimulus” in Philip Denny, 
Andrew’s model for the good cynic and his sometime moral mentor, and his “pessimism, in his 
skepticism, his cold and measured cynicism”.39 When they first meet, Philip is “blandly 
complimentary” of Andrew’s dispensing of what Philip calls “the dear old mumbo-jummery” 
(Citadel 12). Then “with his assumed air of confidence, more blandly offensive than ever”, he 
laughs with “a mocking appreciation” that Andrew takes as “an insult” (Citadel 13). But, in a 
sentimental turn, Philip “dropped his mocking irony, his ugly features turned morose again. His 
 
 
tone, though bitter, was serious” (Citadel 13). Cronin’s explicit marking of the shift between the 
jocular and the serious, his heavy-handed use of adjectives, differentiates the sentimentalism of 
The Citadel and Philip’s counterpart in The House of God, the Fat Man: “the Fat Man, with his 
LAWS OF THE HOUSE and his approach to medicine that at first I thought was sick but that 
gradually I learned to be the way it was” (House 12). “Cynic”, Roy accuses him, to which the Fat 
Man replies, “eyes twinkling”, ‘Ah, yes,’” (House 52).   
 
The difference between Philip and the Fat Man affects the way these two exemplars of “good 
cynicism” address the problem of excess medical intervention. Both are presented as supremely 
gifted clinicians who advocate minimal medical intervention: Philip, in the interests of promoting 
scientific medicine free from quackery, and the Fat Man, because, in the words of the 13th Law of 
the House, “the delivery of medical care is to do as much nothing as possible” (House 391). For 
both Cronin and Shem, cynicism is acceptable only when combined with clinical excellence. 
Elsewhere, Robbie Duschinsky, Jane Macnaughton and Arthur Rose have argued for a more 
complex understanding of cynicism than is here presented, precisely because it needs to be 
understood as a critical coping mechanism, untrammeled by imperatives of excellence.40 By 
contrast, even the apparent openness to cynicism in these novels can be seen to be circumscribed 
by a value system oriented towards excellence and generic constraints oriented towards clinical 
sincerity. After all, Cronin has Philip break his cynical mask whenever he ventriloquizes Cronin’s 
own belief in the importance of the scientific method. If Shem’s Fat Man never disturbs the delicate 
balance between sincere care and ironic self-positioning, this is more a marker of generic 
differences between the novels than an openness to a reconsideration of the role of cynicism as 
 
 
such: the sentimental The Citadel demands an excess of emotion, where the satiric The House of 
God demands its dissimulation.  
 
Bracketing this generic difference helps us find shared patterns of relation. Both sentimentalism 
and the satire rely more on types than on fully developed characters, since types act as exponents 
of particular values, attitudes or behaviours. Accordingly, the novels correlate particular characters 
to forms of cynicism. This correlation suggests a common typology in both novels: the “good 
cynicisms” of Philip and the Fat Man are contrasted the self-interested cynicisms of careerists like 
Maurice Gadsby and the Slurpers, and the profit-motivated cynicisms of Freddie Hamson and 
Howie Greenspoon. While these cynicisms land differently, according to the generic tone of each 
book, they nevertheless bear enough features in common, to warrant their consideration as a 
typology. Maurice Gadsby, the careerist doctor who takes credit for Andrew’s work on silicosis in 
The Citadel, plays the system for his own benefit: according to Andrew’s friend, Hope, he’s a 
“little thruster […] but he’s not interested in research. He’s only interested in himself” (Citadel 
228). As befits Shem’s less earnest satire, all such “thrusters” are referred to as Slurpers in The 
House of God, defined in the glossary as “House Academics, striving to lick their way up the 
academic medical cone toward the one position at the top—the Chief” (House 396). This social 
capital may be an aspiration for Andrew’s friend, Freddie Hamson, and Roy’s fellow intern, Howie 
Greenspoon, but they are equally interested in material gain. When Freddie sees Andrew at a 
conference, he debunks the suggestion he is there to keep “up to date”: “no, no, old man it’s the 
contacts you make that matter […] I’ve got my eye on a nice little room up West where a smart 
little brass plate with Freddie Hamson, MB, on it would look dashed well” (Citadel 70). “You 
know how it happens”, Freddie summarizes the state of the system for Andrew, “Reciprocity. You 
 
 
scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” (Citadel 70). Howie’s material interest is more comically 
depicted: he wants to win a prize for bringing in the most postmortems.  
 
Andrew and Roy embrace a transitional cynicism, as they experience a gradual attrition of their 
earlier naïve idealism: Andrew decides to pursue a profitable private practice against the wishes 
of his wife, Christine, while Roy becomes less and less willing or able to respond to his patients, 
then his friends, and finally his girlfriend Berry. Christine describes Andrew as “falling victim to 
the very system you used to run down, the thing you used to hate”, eventually exhorting him: 
“Don’t, don’t sell yourself!” (Citadel 316; 317). Berry repeatedly describes the internship as “a 
disease” (House 336), while trying to remind Roy of his core moral values. When both Andrew 
and Roy begin affairs with other female characters, it marks the deleterious effects of their 
cynicism and it is only when they become reconciled with their partners that they begin to 
transition away its more toxic effects.  
 
The women are, themselves, denied more complex inner lives, functioning principally as moral 
compasses to their male partners. Given this position, the protagonists’ transition, then, from 
idealism to cynicism to tempered realism should not be distinguished from the sexism that 
facilitates its representation. Women in both novels are either sexualized objects or paragons of 
moral virtue, and generally denied any agency beyond their service to the male protagonists, a 
condition in keeping with the general sense that the novels rely on types rather than characters. 
This is not just because, as Brenda Beagan would note of the everyday inequalities experienced in 
medical school, the “latent culture” is one that has historically preferred white, middle-class, 
heteronormative men, it also speaks to the underappreciated sense that, in order to be recognized 
 
 
as a cynic (whether speaking truth to power, or accruing social or economic capital), one must 
already be included within the culture, as a voice whose protests warrant serious attention.41 The 
partners of the protagonists are, then, foils to the voices that actually count, those of Philip and the 
Fat Man; their prescient warnings given as much credence as Cassandra’s, and for much the same 
reason. 
 
White male characters are easily identifiable as cynics, whereas female characters are denied the 
positions necessary to exert this disposition, as, indeed, are racialized characters, like Chuck in 
The House, or classed characters, like Conn in The Citadel, who tend to be cast as victims of 
circumstance. If the typology invites reflection on cynicisms at work in different medical systems, 
the sexism that undergirds it suggests we read this typology as more than simply a matter of 
personal disposition. It must be read with an eye to power and privilege. The typology reframes 
the characters as products of the system, where their attitudes may be taken as symptoms of its 
flaws. If it is immediately apparent in the sexism, the racism, the classism at work in both novels, 
it is also entirely consistent with their internal concern with a blinkered reform that fails to address 
these very issues. This unwritten blank normativity sets up the ostensible reform offered by the 
novels as a false offering, inviting the same generally pervasive cynicism about medical systems 
that they seek to diagnose.  
 
Such reflexive problems with cynicism are reproduced in the novels’ most critical moments. In 
Andrew’s impassioned plea at his General Medical Council referral hearing, he accuses “the whole 
profession” of being “too intolerant and smug. Structurally, we’re static. We never think of 
advancing, altering our system”, a further condemnation added to his earlier summary: “If we go 
 
 
on trying to make out that everything’s wrong outside the profession and everything is right within, 
it means the death of scientific progress” (Citadel 417; 416). Roy’s comparable moment of 
realization is his summation of “the one truly great American Medical Invention: the creation of a 
foolproof system that took sincere energetic guys and with little effort turned them into dull, 
grandiose docs who could live with the horror of disease and the deceit of ‘cure,’ who could ‘go 
with’ the public’s fantasy of the right to perfect health devoid of even the deterioration of age” 
(House 378). Andrew’s response is given in public and reconciles his desire to continue with 
medicine by invoking a new value system based on scientific (i.e. evidence-based) medicine. By 
contrast, Roy’s realization is largely self-directed, and, rather than attempt to change the system, 
as Andrew does, he chooses to resign from his fellowship and move into psychiatry. In a moment 
that parallels Andrew’s decision to speak truth to power at his review, Roy considers telling the 
Leggo, Chief of Medicine at the House, the problems with the program: “Should I tell him? No. 
Too cruel […] I’d ask him, give him a way to talk about it, a way of the judgement he was begging 
from me” (House 384). When, however, the Leggo decides “things are fine”, Roy feels “relieved. 
Somehow he’d pulled things back up around him, and could go on, impenetrable, cold” (House 
384). Insofar as cynicism is a coping mechanism, it provides a structural means for both the 
administration and the staff to “go on”, “relieved” by an interminable opposition that encodes 
resistance into the conditions of the system’s survival. This ostensible difference, between 
Andrew’s activism and Roy’s quietism, disguises their mutual privilege: they enjoy the recognition 
that their voices count, if only by their readers.  
 
The novels, then, for all that they appear to be written “outside the system”, should be understood 
as elements within the medical apparatus, legitimizing coping strategies that mask cooption as 
 
 
resistance. Shem has himself written of The House of God as a resistance narrative, where 
resistance, following Anton Chekhov’s thoughts on literature, can be understood as “life as it 
should be in addition to life as it is”.42 In a 2002 article for Annals of Medicine, entitled “Fiction 
as Resistance”, Shem quotes Chekhov to explain his acts of resistance during his internship (the 
inspiration for The House of God). Presented with “a series of moments—which I now call ‘Hey 
wait a second!’ moments—those moments many of us experience every day when we see, hear, 
or feel that something is unjust, cruel, militaristic, or simply not right”, Shem and his colleagues 
“resisted”, by taking “‘life as it is’ and turn[ing] it on the spindle of compassionate action to make 
it more like ‘life as it should be’”.43 Shem’s account of this resistance “to brutality and inhumanity, 
to isolation and disconnection” presents a commendable response to the challenges of the 
internship, but it fails to address the novel’s concern with cynicism.44 By recasting the narrative as 
a matter of resistance, Shem elides the very difficulties the narrative claims to work through: the 
tendency of the interns to shed their values in order to survive and the fact that it describes “all in 
all a pretty typical year”: “all across the country […] terns were being allowed to be angry, to 
accuse and cathart and have no effect at all” (House 371).  
 
Roy realizes that his coping is not resistance during a performance by the mime, Marcel Marceau. 
“What the hell had happened to me?” he asks. “Something had died”; “my calm had been the calm 
of death” (House 334; 335). If cynical detachment has killed this “something”, his naïve idealism, 
his enthusiasm, he only becomes aware of it because the performance awakens in him a shame 
response. As he watches he finds himself “flooded by feeling” (House 334). Turning to the 
prosthetic metaphor, he imagines this as a “hearing aid for all my senses”. That this occurs during 
a performance by Marcel Marceau, however, is not incidental to my emphasis on cynicism and 
 
 
shame, against, say, the language of detachment and despair, or what Roy calls “calm” and “an 
acrid chasm”. For it is Marceau’s performance that triggers in Roy the realization of the cynicism 
of his own performance and brings about the “desperate clawing” of shame. 
 
The last mime skewered me: The Maskmaster switched back and forth a smiling mask, a 
crying mask, faster and faster, until finally the smiling mask got stuck on his face and he 
couldn’t remove it. The human struggle, the frantic effort to be rid of a suffocating mask; 
trapped, writhing, wearing a smile. (House 334) 
 
Switching between the masks, “faster and faster”, destabilizes any sense of an emotional 
attachment to either smiling or crying. This makes the “struggle” to remove the smiling mask, after 
it becomes stuck, the more poignant, since it is a false presentation of the self. The pathological 
extreme of Goffman’s cynical clinician, Roy responds to the Maskmaster’s depiction of a person 
trapped in a cynical performance, because he too must perform for an audience who “will not allow 
him to be sincere”. This shifting of roles, from episode to episode, gestures towards a more gradual 
progression described in the novel, from “conviction or insecure aspiration and ending in 
cynicism”.45 If the story of the internship is the development of cynicism, the plot of The House of 
God is the realization of its pathologies, through shame.    
 
If we return to Berry’s sardonic remark about camaraderie and war, quoted at the beginning of this 
section, we find an implicit link between the medical shaming practices presented in the novel and 
those endured in military training, which, as Bonnie Mann explains, are often meant to forge new 
forms of community between soldiers. Mann identifies, in acts of ritual humiliation, a shame-to-
 
 
power conversion. Shame-to-power conversions describe shaming practices that produce (“are 
converted into”) displays of compensatory hypermasculinity. Such practice, demonstrates Mann, 
are encouraged in institutional contexts, whether medicine or the military. Thus alerted, we can 
begin to find in Goffman’s “total institution” of the internship similar forms of “shame-to-power 
conversion”. Not only does this identification help to explain why sexist, misogynistic and racist 
tropes, often dismissed as merely regrettable, are integral to the novel’s construction, it also 
connects shame to the processes by which the interns develop a moral distance from their work 
and their patients, mirrored, in turn, by the novel’s use of satiric reflexivity as a formal conceit. 
Adapting Mann’s notion of a shame-to-power conversion, we might identify this moral distance 
as the product of a shame-to-cynicism conversion.  
 
Bonnie Mann and the Shame-to-Cynicism Conversion 
 
The Citadel and The House of God are marked by sexism, casual misogyny, racism and classism. 
However, we should not read these features as “regrettable” features of novels that are “products 
of their time”.46 They are absolutely integral to the novels’ development of what Mann, writing of 
sovereign masculinity, calls shame-to-power conversion. Sovereign masculinity, her term for the 
relation between masculine individuals and “sovereignty as it is imagined and practiced by the 
nation”, “is characterized by a denial of both physical and intersubjective vulnerability”.47 Since 
vulnerability is “ubiquitous in human existence”, there is a need to convert this vulnerability into 
something else: sovereign masculinity. Shame-to-power conversion describes this production, or 
conversion process. Sovereign masculinity relies, at its core, on shame-to-power conversion, 
whereby the man is offered some form of power, as an antidote to shame, an honor that “equates 
 
 
with loyalty, first and foremost to the brotherhood he has been invited to enter”.48 Such sites, for 
Mann, may be found in the hyperbolic displays of agency that characterize militarized 
hypermasculinity. Such militarized hypermasculinity is, it seems to me, to be at work in Berry’s 
comment, “there’s the camaraderie, and you’re right, the only reason men go to war is to die with 
their buddies”. So, while Mann’s work may not, initially, appear relevant to the more staid male 
figures in The Citadel and The House of God, her reading of masculinity as the expression of 
national sovereignty may be translated to these treatments of clinicians for two overlapping 
reasons: the oblique interest in national sovereignty in both novels and their expression of their 
protagonists’ painfully toxic masculinity.  
 
Both novels do engage substantially, if obliquely, with the political environment of their particular 
moment, suggesting that the sickness they diagnose in the medical system reflects a more pervasive 
sickness of the state itself. The House of God makes this explicit: it tracks the passage of time in 
the internship, and the gradual deterioration of Roy’s ideals, through references to then US 
President Richard Nixon’s responses to Watergate from July 1973 to the end of the internship a 
month before Nixon’s resignation. The sickness, then, that Berry describes in the interns fits into 
a wider malaise that affects the US nation. The Citadel is less explicit about the political 
dimensions of the medical system, but Cronin does suggest that State control would be as bad, if 
not worse, than the corruption of private practice: “‘It’s the system’, [Andrew] thought savagely, 
‘it’s senile. There ought to be some better scheme, a chance for everybody – say, oh, say State 
control!’ Then he groaned, remembering Doctor Bigsby and the MFB. ‘No, damn it, that’s 
hopeless – bureaucracy chokes individual effort – it would suffocate me’” (Citadel 248). Such 
expressions against the failure of the system also depend on the aforementioned sexism, that denies 
 
 
either Christine or Berry the full development of their characters, and their relatively passive 
acceptance of their partners’ infidelity. Far from being simply supplemental, “blue” writing, the 
graphic descriptions of sexual exploitation in The House of God can be understood, then, to be 
absolutely pivotal to the construction of masculinity in the novel, as an assertion of strength over 
vulnerability that offsets the impasse the (male) interns face, between an unrealizable ideal 
(“idealized care”) and an unworkable system (“total institution). This impasse produces a shame 
that the system cannot but disavow, if it is to continue to function. This disavowal converts the 
shame into a violence that either projects outwards, through detachment or sexual exploitation, or 
inwards, as self-harm as for the intern who commits suicide, Potts. Shame is a constitutive feature 
of both narratives that remains conspicuous by its relative absence. 
 
Shame, as Luna Dolezal and Barry Lyons observe, is  
 
a negative emotion that arises when one is seen and judged by others (whether they are 
present, possible or imagined) to be flawed in some crucial way, or when some part of one's 
self is perceived to be inadequate, inappropriate or immoral. It is what is called a self-
conscious emotion in that the object of shame is oneself and, furthermore, it involves an 
awareness of how other people view the self.49  
 
Lyons, Dolezal and Matthew Gibson have elsewhere shown how shame can have a debilitating 
effect on clinicians: “they may conceal the problem; they may be aggressive and deflect blame 
elsewhere; they may feel unworthy of being a doctor and ‘drown in shame’”.50 As Roy watches 
Marcel Marceau, he describes a parallel experience of shame: “along with this burst of feeling 
 
 
came a plunging, a desperate clawing plunge down an acrid chasm towards despair” (House 334). 
Narratively, Roy’s experience of shame in the theatre is the point of realization upon which the 
bildungsroman turns. Importantly, it does not take place in a clinical encounter. Located in a 
theatre, Marceau’s performance highlights for Roy the cynicism demanded of him in his own 
performative self-presentation in his clinical encounters. If the conversion of shame into cynicism 
allowed Roy to survive his internship up until that moment, the realization of the full impact of 
this cynicism threatens to collapse him back into “an acrid abyss”.    
 
Roy’s encounter highlights the shame involved in the cynical performance of a clinician’s self-
presentation. Andrew’s equivalent moment in The Citadel is, arguably, a more conventional 
encounter with shame for the physician: a sentinel moment where his complicity in a botched 
medical procedure leads to a patient’s death. Charles Ivory, the surgeon who commits the error, is 
described as fully self-presenting as competent: “no one more completely resembled the popular 
conception of the great surgeon […] He had the fine supple hands with which popular fiction 
always endows the hero of the operating theatre” (Citadel 313). However, while he “never looked 
more exactly like the great surgeon of fiction”, Charles is incompetent, choosing to puncture a 
haemorrhagic cyst, rather than ligature its pedicle. As he sees this, “a wave of horror swept over 
Andrew” (Citadel 355). He realizes Charles “can’t operate, he can’t operate at all”. As the patient, 
Harry Vidler, bleeds out, Charles continues the procedure benignly, finishing only after the patient 
has died. While Charles is unaffected, Andrew feels “sick, shattered, on the verge of a complete 
collapse” (Citadel 357). Andrew’s psychological trauma is accompanied by a shame that manifests 
in anger at himself and at Charles: “He was trembling, infuriated by the consciousness of his own 
weakness in this awful situation which Ivory had sustained with such cold-blooded nerve” (Citadel 
 
 
357). Like Roy in The House of God, he forecloses his experience of shame with the numbness of 
a battle-field trauma:  
 
The dreadful shock of the calamity had caught him with the destructive violence of an 
explosive shell. It was as though he, also, were eviscerate and empty. Yet still he moved 
automatically, advancing as might a horribly wounded soldier, compelled by machine-like 
habit to perform the duties expected of him (Citadel 358).  
 
Cronin’s recourse to military style metaphor can, of course, be understood biographically, through 
his service during the First World War, or historically, as an understated reference to the origin of 
the Western doctor in medieval militarism. Certainly, it reinforces the sense that the novel is 
flirting with the same sovereign masculinities theorized by Mann. What it signals for my argument, 
however, is the foreclosing of an experience of shame as a maiming of the self. For our purposes, 
we can side-step arguments about whether Andrew’s feelings are best described as guilt or shame, 
since whatever the object cause, these feelings rebound directly upon Andrew himself. Philipp 
Wüschner suggests that, rather than opposing shame and guilt, we might read them “as a complex 
of distinguishable emotions that nevertheless share […] a transgression as [their] formal object, 
but they differ in its evaluation as well as in their orientation (towards the self in the case of shame 
towards the other in the case of guilt)”.51 This shameful event is the consequence, Andrew decides, 
of his profit-driven practices, and he begins, as a result, to recuperate his previous idealism. It is, 




But if his subsequent actions alleviate whatever guilt he feels, he never resolves his shame over 
the encounter. This is demonstrated, near the end of the novel, when he approaches Mrs Vidler, 
Harry’s widow, “as though the mere sight of her might help him, give him, in some strange manner, 
appeasement from his suffering” (Citadel 404). This “strange manner” might be interpreted as 
Andrew’s attempt to turn his shame into a more resolvable economy of guilt, “that all the calamity 
of these last months came in punishment for Harry Vidler’s death” (Citadel 404). When Mrs Vidler 
refuses to blame him, however, claiming “Harry couldn’t have had a better nor a kinder nor a 
cleverer doctor than yourself”, he sees that “she would never believe him. She had her illusion of 
Harry’s peaceful, inevitable, costly passing. It would be cruelty to shake her from this pillar to 
which she clung so happily” (Citadel 405). While we may not think highly of Andrew’s self-
presentation in this encounter, he experiences Mrs Vidler’s refusal to allow him to be sincere as 
intrinsically shaming: “the encounter, far from reassuring or consoling him, served only to 
intensify his wretchedness. His mood underwent a complete revulsion” (Citadel 405). The 
requirement that he be cynical, in his self-presentation, reinforces Andrew’s feelings of shame. If, 
according to Mann, feelings of shame produce, are converted into, a disavowal of vulnerability 
that becomes associated with power, this process, when mapped in The Citadel and The House of 
God, produces comparable forms of detachment that come to be associated with cynicism. 
Although we might call this a shame-to-cynicism conversion, it is clear that this process does not 
simply move in one direction: rather, it creates a feedback loop, whereby cynicism incites further 






Even as Andrew realizes that he abhors his cynicism, he feels most acutely his shame. Andrew’s 
personal circumstances reflect a broader systemic concern, linking cynicism and shame. But we 
can only understand this dynamic, the shame-to-cynicism conversion, as it operates within a larger 
medical system. Lyons, Dolezal and Gibson argue, the effects of shame are compounded by the 
medical system, or apparatus, which self-selects for “high-achieving perfectionists for whom 
failure is both uncommon and unwelcome”.52 Shame, then, may be deeply distressing on a personal 
level, but it also functions as a (flawed) regulating device for medical institutions. Writing more 
explicitly of shame’s affective economy in relation to the Foucauldian dispositive, Wüschner 
argues that these systems of relation demand, as their necessary complement, the production of 
affects (like shame), through affective arrangements. Affective arrangements produce “certain 
affective dynamics […] by conjoining multiple actors, facilitating affective resonance between 
them and giving (or taking away) opportunities to act on emotions”.53 
 
Affective arrangements, however, are not elements of dispositives like any other. They not 
only belong to the “system of relations” of these elements, but amplify and intensify these 
very relations. The affective resonance they produce can help to constitute the dispositive, 
but may also transform and change it – abruptly or over a longer course of time.54  
 
Affective arrangements describe repeated patterns of affective behavior, which, when considered 
individually, seem to be isolated (and isolating) cases, but, when taken as a group, demonstrate 
clear trends. Shame amplifies and intensifies cynical relations in the novels, which, in turn, shape 
the percepts of shameful behavior within the medical apparatus. The novels, then, bring to light a 
dynamic that operates between clinician shame and clinician cynicism, wherein both might be said 
 
 
to be co-produced. Cynicism can be understood as a reaction to feelings of shame, warding off 
some of its worst consequences. Shame, in turn, might arise when observing cynical behavior, 
especially when that observation implicates the subject. Whereas both novels describe this 
dynamic as a personal journey, experienced by each protagonist alone, their close mirroring of the 
dynamic suggests that it may be understood as part of wider systems, Goffman’s total institution.  
 
We can find this blurring of cynicism and shame, if we return, once more, to Berry’s invocation 
of Goffman. It occurs at the beginning of a fight, whose narrative function is to expose Roy’s 
changing self-image as a doctor and his feelings of guilt for embarking on a clandestine affair with 
Molly, a nurse at the hospital:  
 
We were fighting about Dr. Sanders’ long dying and about the illusion in my father’s letters 
and about my plethora of absent role models and the blossoming idea that the gomers were 
not our patients but our adversaries, and most of all we were fighting over the guilt that I 
felt for having Molly in a dark corner of the ward standing up (House 150)    
 
Within Roy’s dissection of their fight, one can find traces of Goffman’s The Presentation of the 
Self in Everyday Life, but also his work on Stigma. For the fight, if we continue to read it “with the 
grain” of Shem’s first person narration, turns on Roy’s belief in his performance of the doctor role 
(what Goffman describes as the “belief in the part one is playing”) and his “guilt” for his infidelity 
(Roy’s reference to the “dark corner of the ward” suggests that his anxiety stems from concerns 
about “deviance”, rather than about the act itself).55 Given that Roy commences the affair because 
“one way to survive was sexually” (House 115), his “guilt” suggests a structural relation in the 
 
 
novel between sex and professional survival (and, by extension, presentations of the self). By 
introducing Goffman, Berry does not simply open up the novel to reflections on total institutions, 
she also invites us to read it along two axes: the degree to which Roy is “taken in by his own act” 
on an axis of sincerity-cynicism, and the extent to which he begins to perceive “his own attributes 
as being defiling to possess, and [that] he can readily see himself as not possessing”, or an axis of 
guilt and shame.56 What I have sought to demonstrate in this essay is the relation between these 
two axes, whereby shame is converted into cynicism, and cynicism into shame. 
 
Comparing The Citadel with The House of God, in light of their subsequent reception, indicates a 
generalized recognition of cynicism’s importance in developing resources for negotiating medical 
systems. In The Citadel, cynicism frames frustrations with archaisms in the medical system, 
coupled with the desire to reform and modernize. By contrast, The House of God’s frustration with 
the medical system is expressed precisely against those modernizing reforms and the resulting 
“brutal and dehumanizing experience” for interns. If both novels draw on cynicism’s resources to 
express frustration with sclerotic systems, whether archaic or dehumanizing, their changing 
approach to cynicism betrays a further change to physician shame. Whereas physician shame 
remains tightly controlled in The Citadel, to differentiate self-aware excellence from ignorant 
incompetence, it is largely unbounded in The House of God, an affective condition to be reveled 
in. Despite these ostensible differences, the two novels share a formal concern with the relation 
between shame and cynicism, here described as a shame-to-cynicism conversion. The abiding 
influence both novels have on the self-image of clinicians in formation suggests avenues for further 
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